Statutory Interpretation in Missouri by Davis, Matthew
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 81 
Issue 4 Fall 2016- Symposium Article 15 
Fall 2016 
Statutory Interpretation in Missouri 
Matthew Davis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Matthew Davis, Statutory Interpretation in Missouri, 81 MO. L. REV. (2016) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss4/15 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 




Statutory Interpretation in Missouri 
Matthew Davis* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Courts often cite canons of construction when interpreting contracts, 
statutes, and other legal texts.  The canons are useful rules of thumb, often 
referred to as maxims, that suggest which meaning should be ascribed to a 
disputed word, phrase, or provision.1  Several canons are policy driven and 
apply only to certain types of legal texts, but most reflect how people intui-
tively understand verbal expression and apply to all legal writings.2 
Although countless secondary sources discuss the canons used to inter-
pret statutory language,3 few thoroughly focus on the canons cited by Mis-
souri courts.4  This four-part Note attempts to fill that void.  Part II begins by 
organizing and concisely stating roughly thirty rules of statutory interpreta-
tion.  Part III then contends that two of these principles – that the purpose of a 
statute should be furthered and that absurd outcomes should be avoided – 
often lend themselves to unpredictable results.  Part IV concludes by suggest-
ing one way this unpredictability could be minimized. 
 
* B.S., University of Missouri, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2017; Lead Articles Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2016–2017.  I’d like to 
thank J. Andrew Hirth, Bradley Craigmyle, Ben Levin, and Jack Downing for their 
helpful guidance and critiques throughout the writing and editing process.  I’d also 
like to thank the Law Review members who were unlucky enough to be tasked with 
checking my citations. 
 1. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law As Equi-
librium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 66–68 (1994). 
 2. Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. 
L. REV. 1179, 1183–89 (observing that the canons are nearly identical to principles 
used to interpret sacred Hindu texts, the Bible, and the Talmud). 
 3. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012); NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, 
SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (7th ed. 2008) [hereinafter 
SUTHERLAND]. 
 4. I found only two articles addressing the canons of construction applied by 
Missouri courts.  See Craig A. Sullivan, Statutory Construction in Missouri, 59 J. MO. 
B. 120 (2003); B. Michael Korte, Canons of Construction, 29 Mo. Prac., Workers’ 
Compensation Law & Practice § 7.29 (2d ed. 2016). 
1
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II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The majority of this Note is devoted to this Part.  The material that fol-
lows is divided into two subparts.  Subpart A discusses principles routinely 
cited by the Supreme Court of Missouri when it interprets statutes.  To pro-
vide an overview, these rules address legislative intent, statutory purpose, 
ambiguity, “plain” meaning, and the application of the canons.  Subpart B 
collects roughly thirty canons and organizes them according to their relation-
ship to semantics, syntax, context, judicial expectations, and private and gov-
ernmental rights. 
A.  Basic Rules of Statutory Interpretation 
The Supreme Court of Missouri almost always cites a handful of princi-
ples when interpreting statutes.  Normally, the court first explains that it must 
discern legislative intent from the text and interpret the statute to further that 
intent.5  This rule is nearly identical to the presumption against ineffective-
ness, which provides that an interpretation furthering the purpose of a statute 
should be favored.6  For purposes of this Note, these rules are considered 
interchangeable because it is difficult to identify a situation in which both 
would yield different outcomes.7 
 
 5. Stiers v. Dir. of Revenue, 477 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Mo. 2016) (en banc); Greer 
v. SYSCO Food Servs., 475 S.W.3d 655, 666 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).  Several com-
mentators and judges take issue with this method of interpretation.  See, e.g., Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 417 
(1899); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 869–70 (1930); 
Robert H. Jackson, Problems of Statutory Interpretation, 8 F.R.D. 121, 124 (1949); 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 534, 536 (1983).  
In short, these critics contend that relying on “legislative intent” leads to subjectivity, 
particularly when courts must identify how legislators would have acted in hindsight. 
 6. State v. Schleiermacher, 924 S.W.2d 269, 276 (Mo. 1996) (en banc); House-
hold Fin. Corp. v. Robertson, 364 S.W.2d 595, 602 (Mo. 1963) (en banc). 
 7. An example is Household Financial Corp. v. Robertson, a case in which the 
Supreme Court of Missouri interpreted two clauses in a tax statute.  364 S.W.2d at 
597.  The first clause obliged every foreign corporation engaged in in-state business 
to pay a franchise tax based on its “outstanding shares and surplus employed in busi-
ness in the state.”  Id.  The second provided that a foreign corporation employed in 
this state pay only “that portion of its entire outstanding shares and surplus that its 
property and assets in this state bear to all of its property and assets wherever locat-
ed.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The issue was whether the second clause’s omission of 
the word “employed” before the phrase “in this state” meant that property and assets 
located out of state could not be taxed.  Id.  The court answered no on grounds that 
this construction frustrated the purpose of the statute by allowing corporations to 
employ “their cash on hand and used in their authorized business in this state without 
paying the corporation franchise tax.”  Id. at 602–03.  The court could have reached 
the same result, however, by concluding that the legislature did not intend to allow 
2
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After the court explains that it must interpret statutory language to fur-
ther legislative intent, it usually sets forth the standard for determining 
whether a statute is ambiguous.  The court has explained that a text is unam-
biguous if a person of ordinary intelligence would find its meaning plain and 
clear.8  On the other hand, a text is ambiguous only if its language “is subject 
to more than one reasonable interpretation.”9 
The court often cites the plain meaning rule as well: “If the intent of the 
legislature is clear and unambiguous, by giving the language used in the stat-
ute its plain and ordinary meaning, then we are bound by that intent and can-
not resort to any statutory construction in interpreting the statute.”10  In other 
words, the court’s conclusion that a text is unambiguous ends the inquiry and 
bars arguments based on anything beyond the text of the statute.11 
If the text is ambiguous, the canons should be used to identify the legis-
lature’s intended outcome.12  Because different canons often support different 
results,13 courts essentially apply a balancing test.  Although outcome X may 
be supported by one canon, outcome Y may carry the day based on several 
other canons.  At this stage, non-textual evidence such as the precise harm 
that inspired legislative action, the general circumstances surrounding the 
enactment of a statute, and legislative history may also be used to shed light 
 
corporations to avoid the tax “by the simple expedient of keeping . . . cash in another 
state and drawing thereon as their needs required.”  Id. 
 8. Wolff Shoe Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 762 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo. 1988) (en banc). 
 9. State v. Liberty, 370 S.W.3d 537, 548 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).  The court has 
also stated that a statute is ambiguous “when its plain language does not answer the 
current dispute as to its meaning,” BASF Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 392 S.W.3d 438, 
444 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (citation omitted), or when there is “duplicity, indistinct-
ness or uncertainty of meaning.”  J.B. Vending Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 54 S.W.3d 
183, 188 (Mo. 2001) (en banc) (citation omitted).  As far as I can tell, these standards 
restate the standard discussed above.  After all, statutory language is surely subject to 
more than one reasonable interpretation if its meaning is unclear, indistinct, or uncer-
tain. 
 10. Howard v. City of Kan. City, 332 S.W.3d 772, 787 (Mo. 2011) (en banc) 
(citation omitted); see also Greer, 475 S.W.3d at 666.  The plain meaning rule has 
received its fair share of criticism, however.  See, e.g., 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 3, 
§ 45:3 (taking issue with the claim that an unambiguous text is merely “applied” and 
not interpreted because “[e]very occasion to determine whether, and how, a statute 
applies . . . is by definition an occasion to interpret it”); Harry W. Jones, The Plain 
Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 2, 17 (1939) (contending that the rule is simply “applied or ignored . . . at the 
discretion of the interpreting judges”). 
 11. Ben Hur Steel Worx, LLC v. Dir. of Revenue, 452 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo. 
2015) (en banc). 
 12. Parktown Imports, Inc. v. Audi of Am., Inc., 278 S.W.3d 670, 672 (Mo. 
2009) (en banc). 
 13. Ivie v. Smith, 439 S.W.3d 189, 203 (Mo. 2014) (en banc); Howard, 332 
S.W.3d at 787. 
3
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on legislative intent.14  After the court discusses these principles, it typically 
cites canons applicable to the statute at issue. 
B.  Canons of Statutory Interpretation 
Before delving into the canons, a comment regarding their organization 
might be helpful.  Academics often organize the canons under a variety of 
complex headings.15  For purposes of this Note, I drew from a treatise written 
by the late Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner and separated the canons into five 
categories: (1) canons based on semantics (i.e., the connotation of words and 
phrases), (2) canons related to syntax (i.e., the arrangement of words and 
phrases), (3) canons concerning statutory context, (4) canons grounded in 
judicial expectations concerning statutory law, and (5) canons concerning 
private and public rights.16 
 
 14. Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 381 (Mo. 2014) (en 
banc), modified (May 27, 2014); State ex rel. Nixon v. QuikTrip Corp., 133 S.W.3d 
33, 37 (Mo. 2004) (en banc).  Rules of law concerning the use of legislative history 
seldom appear in decisions.  This could be a result of the scarce amount of legislative 
history produced by the Missouri legislature.  This may also be due to Missouri 
courts’ skepticism concerning the usefulness of legislative history.  See Mo. 
Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State, 396 S.W.3d 348, 354 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (ob-
serving that “it is often difficult to tell what the General Assembly would have done 
simply by looking at the legislative history of a given bill”); Missourians for Honest 
Elections v. Mo. Elections Comm’n, 536 S.W.2d 766, 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (ex-
plaining that statements preceding the passage of a statute “are neither conclusive nor 
persuasive evidence”).  Still, Missouri courts have relied on legislative history when 
statutory language is ambiguous.  See Bullington v. State, 459 S.W.2d 334, 338 (Mo. 
1970) (considering the Journals of the House and Senate); State ex rel. Zoological 
Park Subdistrict of City and Cty. of St. Louis v. Jordan, 521 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Mo. 
1975) (considering amendments to a bill before its passage).  Missouri courts have 
also explained that a legislator’s opinion concerning the intent behind a particular law 
may be taken into account if a statute is ambiguous.  See Commerce Bank of Kan. 
City, N.A. v. Mo. Div. of Fin., 762 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (representa-
tive’s affidavit); Risk Control Assocs., Inc. v. Melahn, 822 S.W.2d 531, 535 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1991) (senator’s affidavit); Hastings v. Van Black, 831 S.W.2d 214, 215–16 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (representative’s testimony). 
 15. See generally Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, app. at 97, 98, 99, 101, 105–
08 (referencing, among other things, “textual canons,” “linguistic inferences,” 
“grammar and syntax,” “textual integrity,” “extrinsic source canons,” “constitution-
based canons,” “statute-based canons,” and “common-law based canons”). 
 16. For the most part, the canons in each category are not listed in any particular 
order.  At most, there are two exceptions.  The section concerning semantic canons 
opens with the ordinary meaning canon for two reasons.  First, courts frequently cite 
the principle.  Second, semantic canons that follow the ordinary meaning canon – for 
example, the conjunctive/disjunctive canon – are essentially applications of the rule to 
commonly used words and phrases.  The section concerning contextual canons opens 
with the whole text canon for similar reasons.  Courts often consider other portions of 
a statute when they interpret statutory language, and several contextual canons that 
4
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1.  Semantic Canons 
Ordinary Meaning Canon.  Words and phrases should bear their ordi-
nary meaning unless the context suggests that they should bear a technical 
sense.17  The rationale for this rule is straightforward.  “[T]he principle of 
common sense,” the court recently explained, “requires that courts shall un-
derstand [words] as other people would,”18 and other people would not as-
sume that a word bears “a meaning radically different from that which ordi-
narily attaches to it [] without some explanation.”19  Normally, context sup-
plies that explanation.  Ordinary meaning should not be expected when a 
word relates to “any science, business, profession or sport.”20  Ordinary 
meaning may also be inappropriate when a word is already defined by stat-
ute,21 bears a well-known meaning at common law,22 or has already been 
interpreted by the courts or an administrative agency.23 
 
follow the whole text canon – the presumption of consistent usage, the harmonious 
reading canon, and the surplusage canon among them – are particular applications of 
the rule.  See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at xi–xvii. 
 17. State v. Jones, 479 S.W.3d 100, 106 (Mo. 2016) (en banc); Campbell v. Cty. 
Comm’n of Franklin Cty., 453 S.W.3d 762, 768 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 18. State v. Liberty, 370 S.W.3d 537, 549 n.16 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (citation 
omitted). 
 19. State v. Plotner, 222 S.W. 767, 770 (Mo. 1920). 
 20. Rathjen v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-II of Shelby Cty., 284 S.W.2d 516, 523 
(Mo. 1955) (en banc). 
 21. If the legislature has defined a term by statute, that definition generally con-
trols.  Campbell, 453 S.W.3d at 768; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 1.020 (Cum. Supp. 
2013) (explaining that each definition set forth in Title 1, Chapter 1 of the Missouri 
Revised Statutes governs unless another definition is “specially provided” or its ap-
plication is “plainly repugnant” to legislative intent or the context). 
 22. Belcher v. State, 299 S.W.3d 294, 296 (Mo. 2009) (en banc) (explaining that 
a common law term should bear its common law meaning unless the context clearly 
demonstrates that this result was unintended). 
 23. See, e.g., State ex rel. Proctor v. Messina, 320 S.W.3d 145, 155 (Mo. 2010) 
(en banc) (explaining that a term that has already received an authoritative judicial 
interpretation acquires a technical legal sense and should bear that meaning); Bal-
loons over the Rainbow, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 427 S.W.3d 815, 825–26 (Mo. 2014) 
(en banc) (noting that if the legislature enacts a statute using a term that has already 
received an authoritative judicial interpretation, courts presume the legislature intend-
ed to adopt that interpretation); Hayes v. City of Kan. City, 241 S.W.2d 888, 892 
(Mo. 1951) (observing that if the legislature closely copies the statute of another state 
after the highest court of that state has construed a term within that statute, courts 
presume the legislature intended to adopt that interpretation); Farrow v. Saint Francis 
Med. Ctr., 407 S.W.3d 579, 592 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (explaining that the long-
standing interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency charged with its con-
struction is entitled to deference unless the statute is unambiguous). 
5
Davis: Statutory Interpretation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1132 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
Presumption of Illustrative “Include.”  The word “include” sets forth 
examples, not an exhaustive list.24  Although some courts have observed that 
the term may be “ambiguous and its meaning may vary according to the con-
text,”25 an appellate court recently surveyed Missouri cases and found that the 
term “has almost universally been construed . . . as a term of enlargement.”26 
Conjunctive/Disjunctive Canon.  “And” ordinarily bears its conjunctive 
sense and means “along with or together with,”27 while “or” normally bears 
its disjunctive sense and denotes a choice between “either this or that.”28  But 
“and” may mean “or” (and vice versa) when a literal interpretation would 
ignore legislative intent, result in absurdity, or amount to a refusal to correct a 
mistake.29 
Mandatory/Discretionary Canon.  The word “shall” normally imposes a 
mandatory duty,30 while the word “may” ordinarily grants discretion.31  But 
for statutes providing that public actors “shall” perform some act, the out-
come turns on whether there is a sanction for noncompliance.32  A statute is 
mandatory if it prescribes a sanction for noncompliance33 but discretionary if 
it does not.34 
Subordinating/Superordinating Canon.  Subordinating language such as 
“subject to” resolves statutory conflict by signaling that a provision “subject 
to” another provision will yield if conflict arises.35  Superordinating language 
such as “notwithstanding” also remedies statutory conflict by indicating that a 
 
 24. Kieffer v. Kieffer, 590 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Mo. 1979) (en banc); St. Louis Cty. 
v. State Highway Comm’n, 409 S.W.2d 149, 153 (Mo. 1966). 
 25. Kieffer, 590 S.W.2d at 918. 
 26. Short v. S. Union Co., 372 S.W.3d 520, 532–33 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 
 27. Stiers v. Dir. of Revenue, 477 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Mo. 2016) (en banc). 
 28. Council Plaza Redevelopment Corp. v. Duffey, 439 S.W.2d 526, 532 (Mo. 
1969) (en banc); Norberg v. Montgomery, 173 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Mo. 1943) (en 
banc). 
 29. Stiers, 477 S.W.3d at 615; 801 Skinker Boulevard Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 
395 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo. 2013) (en banc), modified (Feb. 26, 2013). 
 30. State ex rel. State v. Parkinson, 280 S.W.3d 70, 76 (Mo. 2009) (en banc); 
Bauer v. Transitional Sch. Dist. of City of St. Louis, 111 S.W.3d 405, 408 (Mo. 2003) 
(en banc). 
 31. State ex rel. Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Ruddy, 592 S.W.2d 789, 794–95 (Mo. 
1980) (en banc). 
 32. Frye v. Levy, 440 S.W.3d 405, 409–10 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 33. Id.; Garzee v. Sauro, 639 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Mo. 1982). 
 34. Williams v. State, Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Children’s Div., 440 S.W.3d 425, 
428 (Mo. 2014) (en banc).  Some opinions suggest, however, that a sanction may not 
be dispositive if the statute makes clear that the act is mandatory.  See Frye, 440 
S.W.3d at 409–10 (explaining that a statute may be mandatory if it explicitly provides 
that an act “can be taken only before the stated deadline or can be performed only in 
the stated manner”). 
 35. Weinstock v. Holden, 995 S.W.2d 411, 418 (Mo. 1999) (en banc). 
6
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provision “notwithstanding” another will prevail if conflict arises.36  When a 
statute contains a “notwithstanding” clause, conflict arises only if the provi-
sion with which it clashes also has a “notwithstanding” clause.37 
Omitted Case Canon.  The court repeatedly explains that unambiguous 
statutes should be interpreted as they are written, not as they might have been 
written in hindsight.38  This principle could be considered an extension of the 
plain meaning rule.  If the task of a court is simply to apply an unambiguous 
text, it follows that a court should not interpret that text as if it covers other 
matters. 
Negative Implication Canon.  The expression of one thing normally im-
plies the exclusion of another.39  For example, a statute taxing the sale of 
“meals and drinks furnished [at a] place in which . . . meals or drinks are reg-
ularly served to the public” does not tax the sale of meals and drinks served at 
private country clubs.40  The court occasionally observes that this rule – more 
commonly referred to as expressio (or inclusio) unius est exclusio alterius – 
“must be applied with great caution.”41  Unless there is a strong and natural 
inference that the thing omitted was intentionally excluded, the court may 
conclude that the rule is inapplicable.42 
Gender/Number Canon.  Unless the context clearly suggests otherwise, 
the masculine includes the feminine (and vice versa),43 and the singular in-
cludes the plural (and vice versa).44 
2.  Syntactic Canons 
Grammar/Punctuation Canon.  Grammar and punctuation are permissi-
ble indicators of meaning when statutory language is ambiguous.45  However, 
 
 36. Earth Island Inst. v. Union Elec. Co., 456 S.W.3d 27, 33–34 (Mo. 2015) (en 
banc); Kidde Am., Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 242 S.W.3d 709, 712 (Mo. 2008) (en 
banc). 
 37. State ex rel. City of Jennings v. Riley, 236 S.W.3d 630, 632 (Mo. 2007) (en 
banc). 
 38. State v. Hardin, 429 S.W.3d 417, 420 (Mo. 2014) (en banc); Loren Cook Co. 
v. Dir. of Revenue, 414 S.W.3d 451, 454 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 39. Six Flags Theme Parks, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 179 S.W.3d 266, 269–70 
(Mo. 2005) (en banc). 
 40. Greenbriar Hills Country Club v. Dir. of Revenue, 935 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Mo. 
1996) (en banc). 
 41. Six Flags, 179 S.W.3d at 269–70; Springfield City Water Co. v. City of 
Springfield, 182 S.W.2d 613, 618 (Mo. 1944). 
 42. Six Flags, 179 S.W.3d at 270. 
 43. State v. Stokely, 842 S.W.2d 77, 80 (Mo. 1992) (en banc); see also MO. REV. 
STAT. § 1.030.2 (2000). 
 44. State ex rel. BJC Health Sys. v. Neill, 121 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Mo. 2003) (en 
banc), modified on denial of reh’g (Dec. 23, 2003); State ex inf. Gentry v. Long-Bell 
Lumber Co., 12 S.W.2d 64, 80 (Mo. 1928) (en banc). 
 45. State ex rel. Pearson v. La. & M. R. R. Co., 114 S.W. 956, 958 (Mo. 1908). 
7
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the Supreme Court of Missouri has explained that courts should be reluctant 
to discern meaning solely from grammar or punctuation,46 particularly when 
an unreasonable or absurd result follows.47 
Last Antecedent Rule.  Relative and qualitative words, phrases, or claus-
es generally apply only to the words or phrases immediately preceding 
them.48  To provide an example, the court once examined a constitutional 
amendment defining “residential property” as “all real property improved by 
a structure which is used or intended to be used for residential living . . . and 
which contains not more than four dwelling units.”49  Applying the rule, the 
court concluded that the phrase “which contains not more than four dwelling 
units” modified “structure” – the nearest referent – rather than “all real prop-
erty.”50  The court has explained, however, that the rule should not apply if 
the relative or qualitative clause is equally applicable to all terms at issue.51  
For example, the court found the rule did not apply to a statute defining the 
term “accounting officer” as “the county clerk, county comptroller, county 
auditor, accountant, or other officer or employee keeping the principal rec-
ords of the county.”52  Viewing the provision as a whole, the court reasoned 
that the phrase “keeping the principal records of the county” was equally 
applicable to all positions.53 
Proviso Canon.  A proviso (e.g., “provided”) generally carves out an 
exception to the text that immediately precedes it.54  Older opinions provide 
some basis for arguing that the use of language which would otherwise create 
a proviso should be construed in a conjunctive sense.55 
 
 46. Abrams v. Ohio Pac. Express, 819 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Mo. 1991) (en banc). 
 47. State ex rel. Geaslin v. Walker, 257 S.W. 470, 472 (Mo. 1924) (en banc). 
 48. Spradling v. SSM Health Care St. Louis, 313 S.W.3d 683, 688 (Mo. 2010) 
(en banc); Rothschild v. State Tax Comm’n of Mo., 762 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Mo. 1988) 
(en banc). 
 49. Rothschild, 762 S.W.2d at 36–37. 
 50. Id. at 37. 
 51. Spradling, 313 S.W.3d at 688; Norberg v. Montgomery, 173 S.W.2d 387, 
390 (Mo. 1943) (en banc). 
 52. Norberg, 173 S.W.2d at 389. 
 53. Id. at 390–91. 
 54. State ex rel. McMonigle v. Spears, 213 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Mo. 1948) (en 
banc), abrogated as recognized in City of Chesterfield v. Dir. of Revenue, 811 
S.W.2d 375 (Mo. 1991) (en banc); Smith v. Pettis Cty., 136 S.W.2d 282, 287–88 
(Mo. 1940). 
 55. McMonigle, 213 S.W.2d at 213; Bowers v. Mo. Mut. Ass’n, 62 S.W.2d 
1058, 1063 (Mo. 1933). 
8
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3.  Contextual Canons 
Whole Text Canon.  Ambiguous statutory language should be read in 
light of the entire statute, not in isolation.56  Any part of a statute, including 
its title and preamble,57 may be used to shed light on which meaning of a 
word, phrase, or provision should be favored. 
Presumption of Consistent Usage.  Courts presume that a particular 
word or phrase bears the same meaning throughout a statute.58  The more 
often different – though seemingly synonymous – words or phrases appear 
within a statute, the stronger the presumption that they bear distinct mean-
ings.59  To provide an illustration, the court once relied on this principle when 
interpreting two sections of a statute concerning mental health facilities.60  
One authorized a sheriff to deny a concealed carry permit to an applicant who 
had been “committed to a mental health facility.”61  The other authorized 
temporary, involuntary “detention” in a mental health facility for an evalua-
tion.62  The dispute arose when a sheriff denied the plaintiff’s application for 
a concealed carry permit on grounds that the plaintiff had been “committed” 
due to his prior “detention” in a mental health facility.63  After the trial court 
upheld the denial of the plaintiff’s application, the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri reversed, explaining that: 
If the legislature intended for the terms “committed” and “detention” 
to have the same meaning, it could have utilized consistent terminolo-
gy by using one term or the other.  Holding that the term “committed” 
 
 56. St. Louis Cty. v. Prestige Travel, Inc., 344 S.W.3d 708, 714 (Mo. 2011) (en 
banc); Util. Serv. Co. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. Relations, 331 S.W.3d 654, 658 
(Mo. 2011) (en banc). 
 57. Gurley v. Mo. Bd. of Private Investigator Exam’rs, 361 S.W.3d 406, 413 
(Mo. 2012) (en banc) (discussing the use of a statute’s title); Lackland v. Walker, 52 
S.W. 414, 430 (Mo. 1899) (discussing the use of a statute’s preamble).  The court has 
stated, however, that chapter, article, or section headings may not be used on the theo-
ry that these markings, unlike titles and preambles, are not part of the statute and have 
been added after the fact merely for the convenience of the reader.  Gurley, 361 
S.W.3d at 413. 
 58. See Nelson v. Crane, 187 S.W.3d 868, 870 (Mo. 2006) (en banc). 
 59. Alberici Constructors, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 452 S.W.3d 632, 638 (Mo. 
2015) (en banc); Nelson, 187 S.W.3d at 870.  The court has added that the reenact-
ment of a statute containing synonymous though different terms further “emphasizes 
that both words have distinct meanings.”  See Cox v. Dir. of Revenue, 98 S.W.3d 548, 
550 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 60. See Nelson, 187 S.W.3d at 868. 
 61. Id. at 870. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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. . . is synonymous with the term “detention” . . . would render super-
fluous the distinct terminology employed by the legislature.64 
Surplusage Canon.  Ideally, “every word, clause, sentence, and provi-
sion of a statute” should be given effect.65  Because each word of a statute is 
presumed to have been included for a particular purpose, an interpretation 
rendering statutory language redundant or without meaning is disfavored.66  
The court recently applied this canon to a statute exempting “materials” from 
a use tax.67  To avoid the tax, the plaintiff contended that “materials” included 
“machinery” such as cranes and a welder.68  The court disagreed, explaining 
that reading “materials” to include “machinery” would create redundancy in a 
separate section discussing “[m]aterials, manufactured goods, machinery and 
parts.”69 
Harmonious Reading Canon.  The provisions of a statute should be con-
strued to avoid conflict, mainly on the theory that a statute is passed as a uni-
fied whole and its parts are directed towards one coherent purpose.70  As a 
result, courts disfavor interpretations that would cause one provision of a 
statute to clash with its counterparts.71  For example, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri once applied this canon to avoid potential conflict in a statute gov-
erning tax proposals.72  The second subsection required all county ballots for 
a sales tax to specify the tax rate, the duration of the tax, and a designated 
capital improvement purpose.73  After the people of Wayne County approved 
a ballot that imposed a tax of an indefinite duration, the plaintiffs argued that 
the tax was unauthorized because the second subsection imposed a mandatory 
time limit.74  The court disagreed on grounds that a mandatory time limit was 
incompatible with the rest of the statute.75  Although the second subsection 
required all ballots to specify the duration of the tax, the court reasoned that 
the tax could be imposed for an indefinite duration because the first subsec-
 
 64. Id. 
 65. 801 Skinker Boulevard Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 395 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo. 
2013) (en banc), modified (Feb. 26, 2013); see also State v. Jones, 479 S.W.3d 100, 
106 (Mo. 2016) (en banc). 
 66. Saint Charles Cty. v. Dir. of Revenue, 407 S.W.3d 576, 578 (Mo. 2013) (en 
banc). 
 67. Alberici Constructors, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 452 S.W.3d 632, 636 (Mo. 
2015) (en banc). 
 68. Id. at 638. 
 69. Id. (alteration in original). 
 70. See State ex rel. Evans v. Brown Builders Elec. Co., 254 S.W.3d 31, 35 (Mo. 
2008) (en banc). 
 71. Hovis v. Daves, 14 S.W.3d 593, 596 (Mo. 2000) (en banc). 
 72. Id. at 593. 
 73. Id. at 595. 
 74. Id. at 594. 
 75. Id. at 595–96. 
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tion failed to mention the tax’s duration, and the third subsection specified 
that the tax could terminate upon repeal.76 
General/Specific Canon.  Occasionally, statutory provisions clash and 
cannot be reconciled so that both are given effect.  When there is only partial 
conflict, the specific provision governs to the extent that it clashes with the 
general one.77  In other words, the specific provision is an exception to its 
general counterpart.78  The court recently applied this canon to two statutes 
concerning the authority of the Director of the Department of Corrections 
(“Director”).79  The Director, relying on a statute that authorized him to enact 
rules governing prison management, denied the defendant, an inmate on 
death row, the right to select a witness to his execution.80  In response, the 
defendant cited another statute that obligated the Director upon request to 
allow designated individuals to witness an execution.81  The court ruled in 
favor of the defendant, explaining that the statute imposing specific duties 
concerning execution prevailed to the extent that it clashed with the statute 
granting the Director general discretion to enact rules.82 
Presumption Against Absurdity.  Because courts presume that the legis-
lature enacts rational statutes, constructions that yield absurd results are dis-
favored.83  When an unambiguous statute yields an absurd result, courts may 
correct verbal inaccuracies, clerical errors, or misprints.84  Although the Su-
preme Court of Missouri has cautioned that the power to correct these errors 
should be exercised sparingly,85 it has not provided guidance concerning what 
sort of outcome is so “absurd” that an unambiguous statute may be ignored or 
corrected.  As discussed below, the court has occasionally found sufficient 
absurdity when an outcome appears to defeat the broader purpose of a statute.  
More stringent standards exist, however.  According to the leading treatise in 
the field, an absurd outcome is one “so unreasonable ‘as to shock general 
 
 76. Id. at 596. 
 77. State ex rel. Taylor v. Russell, 449 S.W.3d 380, 382 (Mo. 2014) (en banc); 
Turner v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660, 668 (Mo. 2010) (en banc). 
 78. S. Metro. Fire Prot. Dist. v. City of Lee’s Summit, 278 S.W.3d 659, 666 
(Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 79. Russell, 449 S.W.3d at 380.  The general/specific canon also applies to relat-
ed statutes, which are discussed infra Part II.B.4. 
 80. Russell, 449 S.W.3d at 381–82. 
 81. Id. at 382. 
 82. Id. 
 83. State v. Nash, 339 S.W.3d 500, 508 (Mo. 2011) (en banc); Reichert v. Bd. of 
Educ. of City of St. Louis, 217 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Mo. 2007) (en banc). 
 84. Learned v. Godfrey, 461 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Mo. 1970) (en banc); Deimeke v. State 
Highway Comm’n, 444 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Mo. 1969). 
 85. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Loeb, 318 S.W.2d 246, 252 (Mo. 1958) (en banc); 
State v. Hacker, 214 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Mo. 1948). 
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common sense.’”86  Two other commentators suggest that an absurd outcome 
is “a disposition that no reasonable person could approve.”87 
Predicate Act Canon.  A text authorizing an act impliedly authorizes all 
necessary predicate acts.88  To provide an example, a grant of authority “to 
issue bonds for the purpose of raising funds to pay for the construction of 
roads[] necessarily carries with it the authority to pay for rights-of-way upon 
which to build the roads.”89  Though the canon can apply to private affairs – 
for instance, authorization to mow a yard impliedly authorizes trespass – it 
normally applies in the context of governmental powers.90 
Associated Words Canon.  The meaning of an unclear word or phrase 
may be determined by reference to the words immediately surrounding it.91  
When words are grouped in a list, courts presume that the meaning of an un-
clear word within that list is similar to those also listed.92  For example, 
kitchen equipment used to prepare food would not fall within the scope of a 
statute providing a tax exemption for machinery “used directly in manufac-
turing, mining, fabricating, or producing a product,” due to the industrial 
connotations of the terms listed.93 
Ejusdem Generis.  Where general words follow an enumeration of two 
or more things, those general words encompass only things of the same kind 
or class specifically mentioned.94  For example, a statute proscribing the use 
of “bombs, dynamite, nitroglycerine or other kinds of explosives” will be 
construed to prohibit the use of potentially lethal explosives, not non-lethal 
explosives such as firecrackers.95  The presence of a catch-all phrase such as 
“or other” does not always mean that ejusdem generis applies, however.  Alt-
hough there are several situations in which the rule is inapplicable,96 the most  
 86. 2B SUTHERLAND, supra note 3, § 54:6. 
 87. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, § 37. 
 88. Reilly v. Sugar Creek Twp. of Harrison Cty., 139 S.W.2d 525, 526 (Mo. 
1940). 
 89. Id. 
 90. 2B SUTHERLAND, supra note 3, § 55:4. 
 91. Alberici Constructors, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 452 S.W.3d 632, 638 (Mo. 
2015) (en banc); Union Elec. Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 425 S.W.3d 118, 122 (Mo. 
2014) (en banc). 
 92. Union Elec. Co., 425 S.W.3d at 122. 
 93. Brinker Mo., Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 319 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Mo. 2010) (en 
banc). 
 94. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 438 S.W.3d 397, 401 (Mo. 2014) 
(en banc); Pollard v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 665 S.W.2d 333, 341 n.12 (Mo. 1984) 
(en banc). 
 95. State v. Lancaster, 506 S.W.2d 403, 404–05 (Mo. 1974) (per curiam). 
 96. A less common situation is when the specific items “exhaust the class” to 
which they belong.  State v. Smith, 135 S.W. 465, 468 (Mo. 1911).  To provide an 
example, consider a statute addressing “elevated, underground, and other street rail-
roads.”  Ruckert v. Grand Ave. Ry. Co., 63 S.W. 814, 817 (Mo. 1901).  The class 
represented by the specifics is street railroads that do not operate at surface level.  
That class, however, consists entirely of street railroads that are “elevated” or “under-
12
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common is when the enumerated things are so different in nature that they do 
not fall within a common category.97 
4.  Expected-Meaning Canons 
Related Statutes Canon.  Ambiguous statutory language should be read 
in light of separate statutes concerning the same subject matter, more com-
monly known as statutes in pari materia.98  Related statutes are “governed by 
one spirit and policy,” just as the provisions of one statute are directed to-
wards one general purpose.99  Related statutes, like the provisions of a single 
statute, should therefore be construed together as one act to avoid conflict.100  
To avoid inconsistency, a particular word or phrase concerning a specific 
subject – taxes, for example – should bear the same meaning in statutes con-
cerning that subject, just as a particular word or phrase found within one pro-
vision of a statute should bear the same meaning throughout the text.101  As a 
result, an interpretation which would ascribe two different meanings to a par-
ticular word or phrase – one in the statute at issue, the other in a related stat-
ute – is disfavored.102 
To provide an illustration, the court was once asked to determine wheth-
er a school district had complied with a statute that obliged it to fix tax rates 
“to produce substantially the same revenues as required in the annual budg-
et.”103  A related statute contained the phrase “substantially the same amount 
of taxes,” which the court had previously construed to mean “practically,” 
“nearly,” “almost,” “essentially,” and “virtually” the same amount of taxes.104  
Because both statutes involved similar subject matter and used nearly identi- 
ground.”  Because “other street railroads” would be of no consequence if it were 
limited to that class (i.e., surplusage), the phrase must bear its general meaning and 
would embrace surface street railways.  See id. at 818.  Another uncommon situation 
is governed by the rule of rank, which provides that a general word will not apply to 
objects of a higher quality than those specifically enumerated.  2A SUTHERLAND, 
supra note 3, § 47:19.  To illustrate this exception, commentators often observe that a 
statute imposing a tax on “copper, brass, pewter and tin and all other metals” would 
not tax metals of a higher quality such as gold and silver.  Id. § 47:19. 
 97. See State v. Eckhardt, 133 S.W. 321, 322 (Mo. 1910) (explaining that the 
maxim would not apply to a statute proscribing the abandonment of a child in “a 
street or field, or like place” because the terms “street” and “field” are entirely unre-
lated). 
 98. Williams v. State, 386 S.W.3d 750, 754 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 99. State v. Duggar, 806 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Mo. 1991) (en banc). 
 100. Earth Island Inst. v. Union Elec. Co., 456 S.W.3d 27, 33 (Mo. 2015) (en 
banc); Union Elec. Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 425 S.W.3d 118, 122 (Mo. 2014) (en 
banc). 
 101. See Lane v. Lensmeyer, 158 S.W.3d 218, 228 (Mo. 2005) (en banc). 
 102. Union Elec. Co., 425 S.W.3d at 122; Cook Tractor Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 
187 S.W.3d 870, 873 (Mo. 2006) (en banc). 
 103. Lane, 158 S.W.3d at 226. 
 104. Id. at 227. 
13
Davis: Statutory Interpretation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1140 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
cal language, the court concluded that the statute in question obligated the 
school district to fix its rate to produce “practically,” “nearly,” “almost,” “es-
sentially,” and “virtually” the same revenues as required in the annual budg-
et.105  Related statutes may be considered even if they were enacted at differ-
ent times, though the court has added that they have more persuasive force 
when they were passed in the same legislative session as the text at issue.106 
Presumption Against Implied Repeal.  Statutory provisions may be en-
tirely contradictory.  For example, one statutory provision might authorize the 
conduct that another plainly prohibits.  Because both statutory provisions 
cannot be given effect, the later-appearing law impliedly repeals the earlier-
appearing law.107  The rationale for this rule is that a later-appearing statutory 
provision is the last legislative announcement on the matter and should pre-
vail.108  Because courts favor interpretations that reconcile conflict, this out-
come is disfavored.109  However, repeals by implication are justified on 
grounds that the legislature does not intend “to leave on the statute books two 
contradictory enactments.”110 
A decision handed down by the court in the early part of the twentieth 
century provides an excellent illustration.111  One section of a statute declared 
it a felony to “willfully and maliciously kill, maim or wound” another’s 
horse, but the very next declared the same conduct a misdemeanor.112  After 
the defendant broke into a stable, maimed a horse, and was convicted for 
second-degree burglary,113 he argued that he could not lawfully be charged 
with second-degree burglary – “breaking and entering . . . with intent to . . . 
commit a felony therein” – because he committed a misdemeanor.114  The 
court agreed and reversed the conviction, explaining that the later-appearing 
section that declared his conduct a misdemeanor repealed the earlier-
appearing one that declared his conduct a felony.115 
Presumption Against Change in the Common Law.  When it is uncertain 
whether a statute displaces common law rights, courts retain the common 
 
 105. Id. at 228. 
 106. See State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus. Relations, Div. of Labor Standards v. 
SKC Elec., Inc., 936 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Mo. 1997) (en banc). 
 107. Earth Island Inst. v. Union Elec. Co., 456 S.W.3d 27, 35 (Mo. 2015) (en 
banc); St. Charles Cty. v. Dir. of Revenue, 961 S.W.2d 44, 47 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). 
 108. Edwards v. St. Louis Cty., 429 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Mo. 1968) (en banc); State 
v. Taylor, 85 S.W. 564, 567 (Mo. 1905). 
 109. St. Charles Cty., 961 S.W.2d at 47; Cty. of Jefferson v. Quiktrip Corp., 912 
S.W.2d 487, 490 (Mo. 1995) (en banc). 
 110. State ex rel. & to Use of George B. Peck Co. v. Brown, 105 S.W.2d 909, 
911–12 (Mo. 1937) (en banc). 
 111. See Taylor, 85 S.W. at 564. 
 112. Id. at 565. 
 113. Id. at 564–65. 
 114. Id. at 565. 
 115. Id. 
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law.116  A statute will not be interpreted to preempt a common law claim un-
less it does so clearly.117  Absent clear preemptory language, a statutory right 
of action will not supplant common law remedies unless the statutory remedy 
“fully comprehends and envelops” them.118  And even if a statute alters the 
common law, any doubt concerning the extent of this alteration is construed 
in favor of making the least change.119 
Reenactment Canon.  Courts presume that the changes made in a statute 
upon its reenactment are meant to change its meaning, mainly on the theory 
that the legislature does not engage in “meaningless acts of housekeeping.”120 
Presumption of Constitutional Validity.  Courts presume that most stat-
utes are constitutionally valid on grounds that the legislature is aware of its 
constitutional limitations.121  As a result, courts disfavor an interpretation that 
would render an ambiguous statute unconstitutional when the statute is sus-
ceptible to any reasonable construction upholding its constitutionality.122  To 
prove that a statute is unconstitutional, a challenger must show that one of its 
provisions “clearly and undoubtedly” or “plainly and palpably” violates a 
constitutional provision.123 
Presumption Against Retroactivity.  The court has interpreted our con-
stitutional prohibition against retroactive laws to proscribe only substantive 
laws.124  Substantive laws “relate to the rights and duties giving rise to a 
 
 116. State ex rel. KCP & L Greater Mo. Operations Co. v. Cook, 353 S.W.3d 14, 
20–21 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011); In re Estate of Parker, 25 S.W.3d 611, 614–15 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2000). 
 117. Cook, 353 S.W.3d at 20; Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62, 
69 (Mo. 2000) (en banc).  For an example of clear preemption, see MO. ANN. STAT. § 
1.010 (West 2016). 
 118. Cook, 353 S.W.3d at 20; In re Estate of Williams v. Williams, 12 S.W.3d 
302, 307 (Mo. 2000) (en banc). 
 119. Williams, 12 S.W.3d at 307. 
 120. State v. Liberty, 370 S.W.3d 537, 552 (Mo. 2012) (en banc); Cox v. Dir. of 
Revenue, 98 S.W.3d 548, 550 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 121. Hill v. Boyer, 480 S.W.3d 311, 313–14 (Mo. 2016) (en banc); State v. 
Meacham, 470 S.W.3d 744, 746 (Mo. 2015) (en banc); State ex rel. McClellan v. 
Godfrey, 519 S.W.2d 4, 8–9 (Mo. 1975) (en banc). 
 122. Meacham, 470 S.W.3d at 746; State v. Burnau, 642 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Mo. 
1982) (en banc). 
 123. Boyer, 480 S.W.3d at 314; Meacham, 470 S.W.3d at 746.  If the challenger 
meets this burden, the unconstitutional provision will be severed, and the remaining 
provisions will normally remain in effect.  See MO. REV. STAT. § 1.140 (2000).  But if 
the valid provisions cannot be properly executed or are dependent upon the void pro-
vision, the entire statute will be invalidated.  State ex rel. Bunker Res. Recycling & 
Reclamation, Inc. v. Mehan, 782 S.W.2d 381, 389 (Mo. 1990) (en banc); Simpson v. 
Kilcher, 749 S.W.2d 386, 393 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), overruled by Kilmer v. Mun, 17 
S.W.3d 545 (Mo. 2000) (en banc). 
 124. Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Jefferson City, 862 S.W.2d 338, 341 
(Mo. 1993) (en banc). 
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cause of action”125 and may take one of several forms.  For example, laws 
that impair a vested right, impose a new duty, or attach a disability on past 
transactions are substantive.126  A substantive law normally does not apply 
retroactively unless it expressly states or unavoidably implies otherwise.127  A 
procedural law, on the other hand, applies retroactively unless the legislature 
expressly states otherwise.128  If a law is both substantive and procedural, the 
substantive part applies prospectively and the non-substantive part applies 
retroactively.129  For example, a statute of limitation relates to processing a 
cause of action and provides a defendant a vested right to be free from suit 
once it expires.130  As a result, laws authorizing causes of action that are oth-
erwise barred under a statute of limitation violate the constitutional prohibi-
tion against retroactive laws.131 
Pending Action Canon.  If a statute is altered during the pendency of a 
lawsuit, a court must apply the new version of the law, unless doing so would 
violate a vested right, impair a duty, or impose a disability on a past transac-
tion.132  
5.  Rights-Based Canons 
Presumption Against Waiver of Sovereign Immunity.  A statute does not 
waive state sovereign immunity unless its language clearly indicates other-
wise.133  The most common way to waive sovereign immunity is “to specifi-
cally state that sovereign immunity is waived,” but any “express statement of 
the legislature’s intent to allow itself to be sued” suffices.134 
Rule of Lenity.  An ambiguity in a penal statute is construed in favor of 
the accused.135  Although this rule traditionally applies to statutes that define 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Rentschler v. Nixon, 311 S.W.3d 783, 788 (Mo. 2010) (en banc), modified 
on denial of reh’g (May 11, 2010); Barbieri v. Morris, 315 S.W.2d 711, 714 (Mo. 
1958); see also MO. REV. STAT. § 1.170. 
 127. State v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Mo. 2015) (en banc); State ex rel. 
Schottel v. Harman, 208 S.W.3d 889, 892 (Mo. 2006) (en banc). 
 128. State ex rel. Riordan v. Dierker, 956 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Mo. 1997) (en banc). 
 129. Roman Catholic Diocese of Jefferson City, 862 S.W.2d at 338. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Keeran v. Myers, 172 S.W.3d 466, 468 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); see also State 
v. Graham, 13 S.W.3d 290, 292–93 (Mo. 2000) (en banc) (construing pre-2005 ver-
sion of the governing law). 
 133. Garland v. Ruhl, 455 S.W.3d 442, 446 (Mo. 2015) (en banc); Zweig v. Met-
ro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 412 S.W.3d 223, 246–47 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 134. Bachtel v. Miller Cty. Nursing Home Dist., 110 S.W.3d 799, 804 (Mo. 2003) 
(en banc). 
 135. State v. Graham, 204 S.W.3d 655, 656 (Mo. 2006) (en banc); Woods v. 
State, 176 S.W.3d 711, 712 (Mo. 2005) (en banc). 
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criminal behavior and provide for sentencing,136 it may also apply when the 
violation of a civil statute yields penal consequences.137 
Presumption Against Taxation.  Unless the government demonstrates 
“specific or clearly implied authority for a tax,”138 an ambiguity in a statute 
levying taxes is construed in favor of the taxpayer.139  The taxpayer and gov-
ernment exchange places, however, when a tax exemption is at issue.  Unless 
the taxpayer establishes “by clear and unequivocal proof that it qualifies for 
[the] exemption,”140 an ambiguity in a tax exemption is construed in the gov-
ernment’s favor on the theory that granting a tax exemption amounts to a 
renunciation of sovereignty.141 
Presumption Against Implied Cause of Action.  Merely because a statute 
proscribes an act does not impliedly create a private cause of action for its 
violation, particularly when there are other means of enforcement and a pri-
vate remedy does not further the statutory purpose.142  A private cause of 
action will not be recognized unless it is expressly found in or clearly implied 
from the text.143 
Presumption Against Narrowly Applying Remedial Statutes.  A remedial 
statute is broadly defined as any statute enacted to protect life, property, or 
the public welfare.144  When it is uncertain whether a remedial statute applies, 
courts resolve the ambiguity in favor of its application.145  There are a hand-
ful of standards concerning the construction of remedial statutes,146 but the 
 
 136. United Pharmacal Co. of Mo., Inc. v. Mo. Bd. of Pharmacy, 208 S.W.3d 907, 
913 (Mo. 2006) (en banc); Woods, 176 S.W.3d at 712–713. 
 137. J.S. v. Beaird, 28 S.W.3d 875, 877 (Mo. 2000) (en banc); United Pharmacal 
Co., 208 S.W.3d at 913. 
 138. ITT Canteen Corp. v. Spradling, 526 S.W.2d 11, 20 (Mo. 1975) (per curiam). 
 139. Street v. Dir. of Revenue, 361 S.W.3d 355, 358 (Mo. 2012) (en banc); St. 
Louis Cty. v. Prestige Travel, Inc., 344 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Mo. 2011) (en banc). 
 140. Fred Weber, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 452 S.W.3d 628, 630 (Mo. 2015) (en 
banc). 
 141. President Casino, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 219 S.W.3d 235, 239 (Mo. 2007) 
(en banc); State ex rel. Transp. Mfg. & Equip. Co. v. Bates, 224 S.W.2d 996, 1000 
(Mo. 1949) (en banc). 
 142. Am. Eagle Waste Indus., LLC v. St. Louis Cty., 379 S.W.3d 813, 830 (Mo. 
2012) (en banc); Johnson v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 885 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Mo. 1994) 
(en banc). 
 143. Am. Eagle Waste Indus., 379 S.W.3d at 830; Kraft, 885 S.W.2d at 336. 
 144. Hagan v. Dir. of Revenue, 968 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). 
 145. Tolentino v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 437 S.W.3d 754, 
761 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 146. See, e.g., Util. Serv. Co. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. Relations, 331 S.W.3d 
654, 658 (Mo. 2011) (en banc) (a remedial statute should be “construed so as to meet 
the cases which are clearly within [its] spirit or reason . . . or within the evil which it 
was designed to remedy, provided [the] interpretation is not inconsistent with the 
language used”); Ross v. Dir. of Revenue, 311 S.W.3d 732, 735 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) 
(a remedial statute should be interpreted to “provide the public protection intended by 
the legislature”); Hagan, 968 S.W.2d at 706 (a remedial statute should be construed to 
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common thread is that a remedial statute should be generously construed to 
further its purpose.147  When a statute has both remedial and penal character-
istics, the purpose of its enforcement governs its construction.148  If the reme-
dy is sought, the statute is remedial and will be held applicable in case of 
doubt.149  But if the penalty is sought, the statute is penal and will be con-
strued in favor of the defendant if it is ambiguous.150 
III.  DISCUSSION 
This Part addresses the rules concerning statutory purpose and the ab-
surdity of an outcome, both of which have the potential to give rise to unfair-
ly unpredictable results.  Statutory purpose can be set at varying levels of 
generality, even when only the text is considered.151  And when the circum-
stances surrounding the enactment of a statute or its consequences are also 
considered, purpose becomes even more malleable.152 
 
“accomplish the greatest public good”); State on Info. of Dalton v. Miles Labs., 282 
S.W.2d 564, 574 (Mo. 1955) (en banc) (a remedial statute should be interpreted to 
“suppress[ ] the mischief sought to be remedied”); Tolentino, 437 S.W.3d at 761 (a 
remedial statute should be construed to “broadly effectuate [its] purpose”); Abrams v. 
Ohio Pac. Express, 819 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Mo. 1991) (en banc) (a remedial statute 
should be interpreted to “liberally . . . effect [its] beneficial purpose”). 
 147. As I see it, this rule is arguably unsound due to the overly broad definition of 
a remedial statute.  Applying this definition, it is difficult to identify any law that 
should not be liberally interpreted.  Consider criminal laws.  Laws punishing murder 
are enacted to protect life.  Laws punishing robbery are enacted to protect property.  
Because these laws are remedial by definition, one would expect courts to construe 
these laws to favor punishment of the accused in doubtful cases.  This certainly would 
make murder and robbery less appealing, but courts disfavor punishment when crimi-
nal laws are ambiguous.  Tax laws are another example.  Laws mandating the pay-
ment of taxes are surely enacted to support the public welfare.  Because tax laws are 
remedial by definition, one would expect courts to construe these laws to favor taxa-
tion in uncertain cases, but courts disfavor taxation when tax laws are ambiguous. 
 148. See State ex rel. Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Ruddy, 592 S.W.2d 789, 794 (Mo. 
1980) (en banc). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 876 (1930). 
 152. A notorious example is Holy Trinity Church v. United States, a decision 
handed down by the Supreme Court in the latter part of the nineteenth century.  143 
U.S. 457 (1892).  In that case, the government unsuccessfully argued that a church, by 
hiring a British pastor, violated a statute proscribing “the importation . . . of foreigners 
. . . under contract . . . to perform labor or service of any kind.”  Id. at 458 (emphasis 
added).  Taking into account the harshness of the outcome, our nation’s Christian 
roots, and an influx of cheap labor, the Court concluded that the statute was intended 
to penalize only those employers who hired and imported an unskilled foreign labor-
er.  See id. at 464. 
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An excellent illustration is Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Hogan,153 a case 
in which the Supreme Court of Missouri took an expansive view of statutory 
purpose in order to avoid uncomfortable results that were dictated by an un-
ambiguous statute.  In pertinent part, the governing statute stated that: 
No automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out of the . 
. . use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered . . . unless coverage is 
provided . . . for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of unin-
sured motor vehicles . . . .154 
Before the case was transferred to the court “for the purpose of reexam-
ining the existing law,”155 lower courts had interpreted this statute to allow an 
insurer to deny a plaintiff’s claim if the vehicle, but not the driver, was in-
sured.156  One court, for example, rejected an argument that the statute should 
be construed to allow recovery whenever a motorist was uninsured, explain-
ing that “the legislature intended . . . what the statute explicitly pro-
vide[d].”157 
Several canons would certainly support this interpretation.  For example, 
the ordinary meaning canon would suggest that “uninsured motor vehicle” 
means just that – a vehicle that is not insured.158  The negative implication 
canon would suggest that the specific inclusion of “uninsured motor vehicle” 
excludes “insured motor vehicle” from the scope of the statute.159  The sur-
plusage canon would suggest that every portion of the statute, including “un-
insured motor vehicle,” is included for a particular purpose and should be 
given effect.160  And the omitted case canon would suggest that the statute 
should be interpreted as it is written, not as it might have been written in 
hindsight – perhaps, for example, to cover situations in which an uninsured 
motorist borrowed an insured car and then negligently harmed another per-
son.161  Taken together, these canons would suggest that the statute is unam-
biguous and the plain meaning rule ought to control. 
Although one could argue otherwise on grounds of legislative intent or 
absurdity, other principles tend to cut against this argument.  Because the 
canons shed light on legislative intent162 and several canons here suggest an 
insurer can deny a plaintiff’s claim if the vehicle is insured, a court could 
 
 153. 605 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1980) (en banc). 
 154. MO. REV. STAT. § 379.203.1 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 155. Dairyland, 605 S.W.2d at 799. 
 156. See, e.g., Miles v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 519 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1975). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See supra Part II.B.1, notes 17–23 and accompanying text. 
 159. See supra Part II.B.1, notes 39–42 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra Part II.B.3, notes 65–69 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra Part II.B.1, note 38 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra Part II.A, notes 5–14 and accompanying text. 
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surely find that the legislature did not intend to allow recovery whenever a 
motorist was uninsured.  And even assuming that the legislature enacted an 
absurd statute by allowing an insurer to deny a plaintiff’s claim as long as the 
vehicle is insured, the statute is far from an ideal candidate for judicial correc-
tion.  After all, courts rarely correct statutory language out of deference to 
later legislative choices, and the circumstances in which courts exercise this 
power are limited.163  Rewriting the statute to address circumstances in which 
uninsured motorists drive insured vehicles would arguably amount to more 
than correcting a clerical error. 
In Hogan, the court concluded otherwise and began its opinion by ac-
knowledging the “theoretical possibility” that the statute might allow an in-
surer to deny a plaintiff’s claim if the vehicle were insured.164  The court then 
recited its governing rule: “[W]e must . . . recognize the cardinal rule that the 
intention of an act will prevail over the literal sense of its terms, otherwise it 
might lead to absurd consequences . . . .”165  From there, the court reasoned 
that the purpose of the statute was to compensate any plaintiff who was neg-
ligently harmed by an uninsured motorist.166  To further this purpose and 
avoid absurd consequences, the court concluded that a “more precise term” 
for “uninsured motor vehicle” was “vehicle being operated by a person whose 
legal responsibility for damages negligently inflicted is not covered by any 
liability insurance provision.”167  This sort of approach – broadly defining 
statutory purpose and departing from unambiguous language on grounds that 
absurd, unintended results follow – is not uncommon.168 
But the court has also defined purpose very narrowly, even when doing 
so yields harsh outcomes.  In one case, for example, the court held that a 
plaintiff’s cause of action was time-barred by a statute of limitation, even 
though the likelihood that the plaintiff could discover her injury before the  
 163. See supra Part II.B.3, notes 83–87 and accompanying text. 
 164. Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 605 S.W.2d 798, 799 (Mo. 1980) (en banc). 
 165. Id. at 800. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. For example, the court was asked to interpret a statute providing that an em-
ployer’s notice of appeal would be considered filed “as of the date endorsed by the 
United States post office on the envelope.”  Abrams v. Ohio Pac. Express, 819 
S.W.2d 338, 339 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).  According to the court, the overarching pur-
pose of this statute – a “remedial” statute at that – was to allow employers to appeal 
adverse judgments.  Id. at 341.  To further that purpose and sidestep an “absurd” re-
sult, the court declined to invoke the last antecedent rule and held that the employer’s 
notice of appeal was timely on grounds that the date imprinted on the envelope by a 
postage meter was “the date endorsed by the United States post office on the enve-
lope.”  Id.  On somewhat similar facts, the Supreme Court was entirely unconcerned 
with the “broader” purpose of a statute governing the timeliness of legal filings.  See 
United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 90–92 (1985) (explaining that the plaintiff’s 
filing on December 31 was untimely and rejecting the argument that Congress actual-
ly meant “on or before December 31 of each year” when it wrote “prior to December 
31”). 
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limitations period expired was slim at best and non-existent at worst.  In that 
case, the plaintiff discovered that the defendant surgeons had left a rubber 
dam in the lower region of her back more than eleven years after the fact.169  
Before the rubber dam was removed, the plaintiff visited several physicians, 
none of whom located the foreign object inside her body.170  After the plain-
tiff brought suit for medical malpractice, the trial court entered judgment in 
favor of the defendants on grounds that the cause of action was time-
barred.171  On appeal, the plaintiff cited the harshness of the outcome in argu-
ing that the limitation period should not begin to run until she discovered the 
defendants’ malpractice, particularly when other trained physicians could not 
discover the rubber dam.172  The court responded as follows: 
This argument is appealing and has some force, so far as justice is 
concerned; in that respect the conclusion we reach is distasteful to us.  
But, the legislative branch of the government has determined the poli-
cy of the state and clearly fixed the time when the limitation period 
begins to run against actions for malpractice.  This argument ad-
dressed to the court properly should be addressed to the General As-
sembly.  Our function is to interpret the law; it is not to disregard the 
law as written by the General Assembly.173 
More recently, the court encountered a “tragic and deeply concerning” 
case in which a hospital employee intentionally administered lethal doses of 
medication to several patients.174  The plaintiffs, family members of those 
patients, brought five wrongful death suits against the hospital once the em-
ployee’s actions – actions purportedly concealed by the hospital – came to 
light.175  In each case, a trial court entered judgment in favor of the hospital 
on the ground that the action was time-barred by the statute of limitation.176  
Appeals followed, and all cases were consolidated before the court.177  On 
appeal, the plaintiffs urged the court to construe the limitation period “to 
avoid frustrating the remedial purpose behind wrongful death.”178  The court 
rejected this “proposed ‘freewheeling’ approach to statutory interpretation,” 
 
 169. Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Mo. 1968) (en banc), supersed-
ed by statute as stated in Ambers-Phillips v. SSM DePaul Health Ctr., 459 S.W.3d 
901 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 314. 
 173. Id. (emphasis added). 
 174. Boland v. Saint Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., 471 S.W.3d 703, 705 (Mo. 2015) 
(en banc), modified (Oct. 27, 2015). 
 175. Id. at 707. 
 176. Id. at 704–05. 
 177. Id. at 705. 
 178. Id. at 710. 
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explaining that the remedial purpose underlying wrongful death could not “be 
used to override or amend its statutory language.”179 
As the cases above suggest, it seems difficult to predict whether courts 
will define statutory purpose broadly or narrowly when an outcome is dis-
tasteful.  But as a conversation between Judge Learned Hand and Justice Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes might suggest, perhaps a court’s view of its role in our 
system of government is the deciding factor: 
I remember once I was with [Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes]; it was a 
Saturday when the Court was to confer. . . . When we got down to the 
Capitol, I wanted to provoke a response, so as he walked off, I said to 
him, “Well, sir, goodbye.  Do justice!”  He turned quite sharply and he 
said, “Come here.  Come here.”  I answered, “Oh, I know, I know.”  
He replied, “That is not my job.  My job is to play the game according 
to the rules.”180 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Although canons and presumptions can be collected, the law of statutory 
interpretation is not too fit for orderly study.  Because different rules often 
point to different outcomes, statutory interpretation effectively amounts to a 
balancing test between different and competing canons.181  The interpretation 
of a statute could be analogized to a determination of fair use, a task which 
Learned Hand described as “the most troublesome in the whole law of copy-
right.”182  But while a fair use analysis is limited to four factors,183 the inter-
pretation of a statute is not.  And because the canons and presumptions have 
no assigned weight, courts may depart from an unambiguous statute on 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. John M. Walker, Jr., Judicial Tendencies in Statutory Construction: Differ-
ing Views on the Role of the Judge, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 203, 203 (2002) 
(alteration in original) (footnote omitted).  Another commentator advances a similar 
argument.  Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the 
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 397 
(1950) (“There is the man who loves creativeness, who can without loss of sleep 
combine risk-taking with responsibility, who sees and feels institutions as things built 
and to be built to serve functions, and who sees the functions as vital and law as a tool 
to be eternally reoriented to justice and to general welfare.  There is the other man 
who loves order, who finds risk uncomfortable and has seen so much irresponsible or 
unwise innovation that responsibility to him means caution, who sees and feels insti-
tutions as the tested, slow-built ways which for all their faults are man’s sole safe-
guard against relapse into barbarism, and who regards reorientation of the law our 
polity as essentially committed to the legislature.”). 
 181. See supra Part II.A, notes 5–14 and accompanying text. 
 182. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curi-
am). 
 183. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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grounds that it dictates an absurd, unintended result, even when that outcome 
appears to be favored by several other rules.184 
Although the rules concerning statutory purpose and absurdity allow 
courts to “do justice,” this “justice” may be unfairly unpredictable.  There is 
no telling whether courts will conclude that a particular interpretation merely 
attempts to “override or amend . . . statutory language”185 or furthers the 
broader purpose of a statute by avoiding an absurd outcome.  To provide 
more certainty on this front, the Supreme Court of Missouri could explain 
what sort of outcome justifies departing from an unambiguous text on 
grounds of absurdity.  Perhaps the standards discussed above – an outcome 
“so unreasonable ‘as to shock general common sense,’”186 or an outcome 
“that no reasonable person could approve” – would suffice.187  Although a 
standard would eliminate some flexibility, it would give lawyers some idea as 
to whether an argument grounded in statutory purpose and aimed at avoiding 
absurdity is likely to prevail.   
 
 184. See supra Part III. 
 185. Boland v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., 471 S.W.3d 703, 710 (Mo. 2015) (en 
banc), modified (Oct. 27, 2015). 
 186. 2B SUTHERLAND, supra note 3, § 54:6. 
 187. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, § 37. 
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